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I. Introduction
In recent years, it has been commonplace for corporations to face
criminal indictment.1 Curiously, employees2 of corporations are winning
the award for best lead actors in a criminal indictment series while
corporations and business organizations are mere nominees for a
supporting role. The question becomes: Why are employees facing
significant criminal charges, when corporations, through mere
"cooperation" with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), are able to sit
back and relax?
The answer is simple. In 2003, then Deputy Attorney General,
Larry D. Thompson drafted a memorandum to all United States
Attorneys entitled "Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,"
better known as the Thompson Memorandum. The Thompson
Memorandum is a revised set of principles instructing prosecutors to
evaluate the criminal culpability of corporations through certain factors
and guidelines.
3
One of the most significant determinants for indicting a corporation
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2008; B.A. Sociology and Anthropology, Spelman College, 2004. The author
would like to thank her family and friends, especially her parents Thee and Ginger
Harrell, for their constant prayers, support, and encouragement while pursuing her
dreams throughout law school and beyond.
1. Corporations are the most frequently named entities in white collar crimes, but
courts have also allowed the prosecutions of other business entities, including
partnerships. J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 15 (2d ed.
2006).
2. Use of the term "employees" includes officers, directors, and agents.
3. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y
Gen., to Heads of Department Components & U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
[hereinafter Thompson Memo].
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is the corporation's promise of support to culpable employees through
the advancement of attorney's fees.4 Pressuring corporations to withhold
from advancing or indemnifying employees' legal fees instigates coerced
statements by employees allowing corporations to avoid criminal liability
because they cooperated. The deceptive tactics employed by prosecutors
are inexorable concentrations of power that have skewed our system of
justice.'
Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York, recognizing
that the government let its zeal interfere with its judgment, deemed
portions of the Thompson Memorandum unconstitutional.6  Judge
Kaplan held that the Thompson Memorandum violated the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it interfered
with the "rights of employees to a fair trial and to the effective assistance
of counsel."7
Judge Kaplan's opinion specifically addressed the pressure and
tactics employed by the United States Attorneys Office (USAO) against
the defendants, employees of KMPG. However, his decision will
undoubtedly have a rippling effect. The Thompson Memo has shifted
the investigative charging and plea process toward an inquisitorial
system by removing the power from courts and juries and placing it
directly into the laps of the DOJ.8
This comment discusses two negative implications that the
Thompson Memorandum had by recognizing the payment of legal fees
by a corporation as an indicator of guilt. First, the memorandum's shift
of power has caused government employees to violate the Constitution
they have sworn to defend by pressuring the denial of the advancement
of legal fees. 9 Second, the memorandum has placed the economic future
of the United States at risk by serving as a potential barrier causing
multinational corporations to relocate its corporate headquarters
overseas.' 0  This comment will also discuss whether the recent
amendments regarding corporate prosecution implemented by current
Deputy Attorney General, Paul J. McNulty, have sufficiently eliminated
the issues surrounding the Thompson Memorandum.
4. Thompson Memo, supra note 3, at VI.B.
5. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1095, at 1095 (2006).
6. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, at 336 (2006).
7. Id. at 382.
8. Wray & Hur, supra note 5, at 1095.
9. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
10. Steven V. Melnik, Corporate Expatriations-The Tip of the Iceberg: Restoring
the Competitiveness of the United States in the Global Marketplace, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 81, at 81 (2004).
[Vol. 26:2
AND THE AWARD GOES TO
II. Criminalization and Corporations
As an intangible legal entity, a corporation can only act through its
agents." Agents are comprised of officers, members of the board of
directors, and other employees. 12 Thus, crimes involving a corporation
allow the government to choose whether to indict the corporation, its
agents, or the corporation and its agents.'
3
Criminalizing both the corporation and its agents is difficult to
conceptualize, because except for crimes that impose strict liability,
proof of mens rea is required. 14  However, through the doctrine of
respondeat superior,15 the United States Supreme Court unanimously
approved the concept of corporate criminal liability in 1909.16 In 1909,
Corporations were emerging as a dominant player in the United States
economy.' 7 This role caused the Court to reason against immunizing
corporations from criminal punishment based on an old doctrine.1 8 The
Court rationalized that, to hold a corporation cannot commit a crime
would virtually take away the only means of effectively controlling the
subject matter of criminal statutes and the abuses at which they are
aimed.' 9
Imposing liability on corporations is beneficial for three reasons.
First, criminal liability ensures corporations will adequately supervise its
agents and employees.2 ° Second, criminalizing corporations encourages
them to develop policies, such as compliance programs that deter
wrongdoing. 2' Finally, criminal liability appropriately places the
responsibility on the corporation which benefits from the wrongdoing,
rather than solely upon individual employees.
22
11. THOMAS R. HURST & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 11 (2d ed. 2005).
12. Id.
13. STRADER, supra note 1, at 19.
14. Id. at 15. Mens rea is the required mental state for criminal culpability. Id. at 9.
Generally, in addition to proof of mens rea, the government must prove actus reus, the
required physical component, and if the crime requires a result, that the defendants acts
caused the result. Id.
15. Respondeat superior imputes a corporate agent's acts to the corporation itself
when the agents are acting on behalf of the corporation, to benefit the corporation, and
within the scope of the agent's authority. Id. at 17.
16. Id. at 16. New York Cent. v. United States was the first case to recognize
corporate criminal liability. See generally New York Cent. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 (1909).
17. New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 496.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. STRADER, supra note 1, at 19.
21. Id.
22. Id.
20071
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III. The Financing of Legal Fees by Corporations
A. The Principles of Indemnification and Advancement
The Thompson Memorandum contradicts the principles of
advancement and indemnification. Both principles date back to the
nineteenth century.23 Advancement and indemnification are derived
from the common law proposition that if an employee has, without fault,
incurred losses or damages during the course of employment, the
employee is entitled to full compensation from their employer.24 Modem
common law remains the same.25
1. Indemnification
Indemnification is the reimbursement by a corporation to its
employees for amounts paid in attorneys' fees, expenses, settlements,
and judgments26 incurred by reason of their official activity and matter.27
Indemnification provides employees with the opportunity to obtain
competent legal counsel, "secure in the knowledge that, if vindicated, the
corporation will bear the expense of litigation., 2 8 However, the right to
indemnification cannot be established until after successful defense,
29
either on the merits or otherwise, of the legal proceeding.
2. Advancement
Advancement is an important corollary to indemnification because
it is an inducement for attracting capable individuals into corporate
service. 30  Advancement protects employees from being required to
personally finance litigation expenses by providing immediate interim
relief.3'
Although indemnification and advancement are alike in theory, they
are in reality quite distinct rights.32 In determining whether to advance
23. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
24. Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, STORY ON AGENCY § 339, at 413 (Charles P.
Greenough ed. 1982)).
25. Id. at 354.
26. Stephen A. Radin, "Sinners Who Find Religion ": Advancement of Litigation
Expenses to Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 TEX. REV. LITIG. 251, 257-
58 (2006).
27. See id.
28. VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998).
29. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (2005).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Advanced Mining Sys., Inc., v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (1992).
[Vol. 26:2
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fees to employees, a corporation does not determine the extent of its
legal liability.33 Rather, corporations advance credit to employees for
legal fees that have yet to be incurred.34 Advancement is necessary
because the decision to indemnify an employee must wait until the
outcome of the investigation or legal proceeding, while advancement
provides immediate relief.35  Nonetheless, advancement fills the gap
allowing corporations to shoulder interim costs.
36
IV. Foreign Investment in the United States
By taxing companies according to their worldwide income and
restricting the advancement of legal fees to employees, the United States
is placing "resident multinational corporations at a competitive
disadvantage compared to foreign multinationals. 37 In order to ensure
American competitiveness in the global economy, the United States must
not only amend its international tax law, but also the Thompson
Memorandum because it directly contradicts the policy of advancement
and indemnification.38
The United States is accustomed to being financed by foreign
investment. Foreign investment in the U.S. dates back to the 1700's.
39
In a Congressional report, Alexander Hamilton noted that foreign
investment "ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary;
conducing to put in motion a greater quantity of productive labor and a
greater proportion of useful enterprise than could exist without it. ''4°
The economic development of the United States was partially
41founded through portfolio investment, a form of foreign investment.
Foreign portfolio investment involves either voting or nonvoting stock in
which foreign investors control less than twenty-five percent of total
ownership in the corporation.42
As society evolved, foreign direct investment (FDI), a new type of
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Kaung v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 504 (2005).
36. Id. at 509.
37. Melnik, supra note 10, at 82.
38. Id. at 83. United States tax laws implemented by Congress are used to support
this Comment and will not be discussed at length. It should also be noted that since the
publication of this Comment the DOJ superseded the Thompson Memorandum with the
McNulty Memorandum.
39. Adis, M. Vila, Legal Aspects of Foreign Direct Investments in the United States,
16 INT'L LAW 1, 1 (1982).
40. DONALD T. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS XLIII (2d ed.
1984).
41. Vila, supra note 39, at 2.
42. Id.
2007]
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foreign investment emerged.43 FDI is direct or indirect ownership or
control of ten percent or more of the voting stock of either an
incorporated or unincorporated U.S. business by one foreign person.44
The difference between portfolio investment and FDI is that portfolio
investment involves only ownership or financial interest, whereas FDI
involves ownership sufficient for a degree of control.45
Foreign investment in the United States grew during the 1970s.46
Multinational enterprises contributed to this growth.47 The enterprises
migrated to the U.S. to obtain a share of the world's largest, richest, and
most competitive market.48 However, in recent years, foreign investment
in the U.S. has sharply decreased.49 For example, in 2004 foreigners
invested approximately $100 billion in U.S. businesses and real estate,
which is far below the $300 billion investment made in 2000, and half as
much as U.S. firms invested abroad.5° Conversely, non U.S. countries
have seen investment inflows increase markedly. 51 For example, foreign
investment in China increased from the annual actual foreign investment
of $40.7 billion in 200052 to $70 billion in 2002. 53
Although foreign investment is not a new phenomenon, the quality
and quantity of it has changed dramatically in recent years.54 The United
States has become an undesirable location for corporate headquarters, not
only because it taxes companies according to their worldwide income,55
but also due to the restrictions placed on corporations through the
Thompson Memorandum.
As a result of international tax laws, both multinational corporations
and unincorporated U.S. businesses are incorporating in foreign countries
in an attempt to decrease their tax liability. 56 Companies that do not
relocate may be subject to foreign takeover, contributing to the $340
billion total of foreign takeovers.57 Moreover, the prosecutorial
43. Id.
44. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (2006).
45. Adis M. Vila, supra note 39, at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3-4.
48. Id.
49. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC At4ALYSIS, 2005, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Id. at5.
52. Lai Pingyo, Foreign Direct Investment in China, 2 CHINA WORLD ECON. 25, 26
(2002).
53. JACKSON, supra note 49, at 5.
54. Vila, supra note 39, at 2.
55. Melnik, supra note 10, at 82.
56. Id. at 81.
57. Id. The $340 billion of foreign takeovers occurred in the year 2000. Id.
[Vol. 26:2
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guidelines initially established in 1999 may also contribute to this
corporate exodus.
V. Criminal Prosecution Guidelines and Corporations
A. The Holder Memorandum
The criminalization of corporations is not a new legal theory.58
Throughout the years, however, there were no uniform elements utilized
for determining the criminal culpability of corporations.5 9 In 1999,
Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder issued a memorandum titled,
"Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations," or what is known as
the Holder Memorandum. 60  The purpose of this memorandum was to
serve as a guide for prosecutors to determine whether a corporation
should be indicted.6' The Holder Memorandum operated as a framework
for prosecutors to analyze their cases and provide a common vocabulary
to discuss their decision with fellow prosecutors, supervisors, and
defense counsel.62
In addition to facilitating prosecutorial judgment, 63 this memo
provided prosecutors with eight factors64 to conduct investigations,
58. New York Cent. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, is the first case to hold a
corporation liable for the criminal acts of their employees. The Court held that because
employees of the corporation exercised the authority conferred upon them, the
corporation could be responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of
their agents. Id.
59. Wray & Hur, supra note 5, at 1099.
60. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., to
All Component Heads U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Holder Memo].
61. Id. at preface.
62. Id.
63. Holder Memo, supra note 60, at § (I)(A) (recognizing that the factors normally
considered in the sound exercise of judgment include the sufficiency of the evidence, the
likelihood of success at trial, the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other
consequences of conviction, and the adequacy of non-criminal approaches). Id.
64. Holder Memo, supra note 60, at § (II)(A) (establishing the eight factors to be
considered include (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, including risk of harm to
the public; (2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management; (3) the
corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it; (4) the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents including, if
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work-product privileges; (5) the
existence and adequacy of the company's compliance program; (6) the corporation's
remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance
program or to improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline
or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant
2007]
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65determine whether to bring charges, and negotiate plea agreements.
However, the delineated factors were only guidelines and not outcome-
determinative.
B. The Thompson Memorandum
On January 20, 2003, then Deputy Attorney General, Larry D.
Thompson, sent a memorandum entitled "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations," (also known as the Thompson
Memorandum) to United States Attorneys.66  The Thompson
Memorandum revised the principles set forth in its predecessor, the
Holder Memorandum.67 In contrast to the Holder Memo, the Thompson
Memo placed a distinct emphasis on the authenticity of a corporation's
cooperation with the DOJ through its "cooperation policy."
68
The Memo directed prosecutors to, inter alia, gauge the extent of a
69corporation's cooperation. Prosecutors were to consider a
corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within its corporation,
make witnesses available, disclose the complete results of the
corporation's internal investigation, and waive attorney-client and work
product protection. 70 Additionally, prosecutors were to heavily examine
and weigh whether a corporation appeared to be protecting its culpable
employees and agents through the advancement of attorney's fees.7'
Although the Thompson Memo includes the eight factors set forth in the
Holder Memorandum, its revisions make clear that cooperation will
weigh in favor of a corporation avoiding prosecution.72 A corporation's
cooperation is not simply a factor; it is a requirement to avoid
indictment. The pressure of corporate cooperation is illustrated in the
decision of United States v. Stein73.
government agencies; (7) collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable; and (8) the adequacy of non-
criminal remedies, such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions).
65. Id.
66. Thompson Memo, supra note 3, at preface.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at § (VI)(A).
70. Id.
71. Thompson Memo, supra note 3, at § (VI)(B).
72. Id. at preface.
73. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
[Vol. 26:2
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VI. United States v. Stein: The Unconstitutionality of the Thompson
Memorandum
A. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution
The right to the advancement of attorneys' fees is grounded in the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. The Due Process
Clause is the foundation of a criminal defendant's right to fairness. 74 As
an element of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause provides
that no person shall be held to answer for a crime without a grand jury.75
Further, the clause ensures that no person shall be, "deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process. 76
The Supreme Court has consistently held that criminal defendants
have the right to be treated fairly throughout the process of a trial.77 The
constitutional requirement of fairness precludes the prosecution from
interfering with the defense of an action. Fairness also precludes the
prosecution from indirectly interfering with a defendant's efforts to form
a defense.79
The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to... the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence., 80  This right guarantees a defendant the right to choose a
competent lawyer to defend his or her case.'
The right to counsel typically attaches at the initiation of adversarial
proceedings. 82 Yet, "perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings"
is during the pretrial phase, a time in which the defendant also enjoys the
right to an attorney.83 As revealed by Stein, the Thompson Memorandum
promotes pressure upon corporations to essentially waive an employee's
right to counsel and an adequate defense.
B. United States v. Stein
On June 26, 2006, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the Southern District
of New York surprised corporations when he ruled that portions of the
74. Id. at 357.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. Id.
77. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
78. Id. at 358.
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
81. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
82. Id.
83. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
2007]
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Thompson Memorandum violated the United States Constitution.84 The
court held that the Thompson Memorandum, combined with the
activities of the USAO, interfered with the defendants' rights to a fair
trial and the effective assistance of counsel.85 The violations infringed,
respectively, on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the defendants.
Stein involved the criminal prosecution of sixteen employees of
KPMG (Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler), one of the largest
accounting firms in the world.86 Prior to the indictment of the employee
defendants in 2004, it was the longstanding voluntary practice of KPMG
to advance and pay employees' legal fees regardless of the crime and
cost.87 KPMG's practice was to pay legal fees without a preset cap or
condition of cooperation for partners, principals, and employees of
KPMG for any civil, criminal, or regulatory proceeding in connection
with the employees' duties and responsibilities. 88  However, upon
pressure from the government, KPMG cut off the payment of the
defendants' attorneys' fees to the defendants.89
The USAO pressed the issue of payment of legal fees in their
conversations with Skadden Arps9° to determine if KPMG would adhere
to its practice of paying the legal fees of employees who faced possible
litigation.9' During one of the conversations, the USAO informed
KPMG that employee misconduct neither should nor could be rewarded
and made reference to "federal guidelines. 92  The court was not
persuaded that the USAO was making reference to the federal sentencing
guidelines. 93 It concluded that the guidelines referred to by the USAO
were the guidelines set forth in the Thompson Memorandum. 94 The
court reasoned that this reference was understood by both KPMG and
government representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees
would count against KPMG in the government's decision whether to
indict KPMG.95
84. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
85. Id. at 353.
86. Id. at 336.
87. Id. at 340 (2006) (recognizing KPMG previously paid over $20 million to defend
four partners in a criminal investigation and related civil litigation brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission).
88. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
89. Id. at 336.
90. The law firm of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flome was retained by KPMG
to assist KPMG in coming up with a cooperative approach to the possible charges it was
facing and to assist with the discussions that occurred with the USAO. Id. at 339.
91. See id. at 341-42.
92. Id. at 342.
93. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 343 n.44.
94. Id. at 343.
95. Id.
[Vol. 26:2
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The actions of the USAO, coupled with the Thompson
Memorandum, had the desired effect.96 KPMG significantly limited its
practice regarding the payment of legal fees to its employees in four
ways.97 First, if KPMG's employees cooperated with the government
and were truthful, KPMG would pay a maximum of $400,000 of an
individual's legal fees and expenses. 98 Second, the payment of legal fees
would immediately cease if the employee was charged with a criminal
wrongdoing. 99 Third, no legal fees would be paid to KPMG employees
who invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege of self-incrimination.100
Finally, KPMG informed its employees that they were not required to be
assisted by a lawyer when speaking with government representatives.101
This pressure led KPMG to enter into a Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (DPA) with the government. 0 2 Generally, DPAs provide
that the filing of criminal charges will be dismissed after a period of time
if the corporation fulfills the obligations set forth in the agreement.
103
The DPA provided that the indictment against KPMG would be waived
in favor of a one count information.104 KPMG would also be required to
admit extensive wrongdoings, pay a $456 million fine, and accept
restrictions on its practice. 10 5 The government agreed to seek a dismissal
of the information if KPMG complied with its obligations.
The court made four broad factual conclusions as a result of the
dealings between the USAO and KPMG. 10 6 These conclusions lead the
court to hold portions of the Thompson Memorandum
unconstitutional. 0 7 The court first concluded that even before meeting
with the USAO, the Thompson Memorandum's influence caused KPMG
to consider departing from its longstanding voluntary practice of paying
legal fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and investigations.
0 8
96. Id. at 345.
97. Id. at 345.
98. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 345.
101. Id. at 346 (stating that in the initial advisory memorandum to employees, KPMG
informed its employees of their right to be represented by. counsel when speaking with
the government, mentioned the advantages of having counsel present, and informed the
employees that KPMG arranged for independent counsel for those who wished to consult
them. Id. However, the USAO did not like the tone of KPMG's advice to KPMG
employees and suggested KPMG inform employees they could meet with the government
without the assistances of counsel). Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
102. Id. at 349.
103. Wray & Hur, supra note 5, at 1104.
104. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
105. Id
106. Id. at 352.
107. Id.
108. Id.
2007]
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The court reasoned that, the language of the Thompson Memo implied
that the payment of legal fees by a corporation may lead to indictment.
Second, KPMG sought an indication from the USAO that its
practice of paying employees' legal fees would not be held against the
corporation. 10 9 However, consistent with the DOJ policy, the USAO
reinforced the Thompson Memorandum's implied threat of indictment.10
Third, the court found that the government's conduct revealed their
desire to minimize attorney involvement."' The USAO accepted
KPMG's offer to cut off fees to indicted employees and KPMG's
assurance that it had no legal obligations to pay employees' fees, despite
knowing it was KPMG's practice to advance legal fees.1 12
Finally, the court concluded that KPMG's decision to cut off legal
fees to indicted employees and condition the payment of fees prior to
indictment upon an employee's cooperation, was a direct consequence of
the pressure applied by the USAO coupled with Thompson
Memorandum.' 13 Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of
the USAO, KPMG would have upheld their longstanding policy and paid
the legal fees and expenses of all its partners and employees without
regard to cost.
114
VII. Protections by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution
A. Concept of Fairness in a Criminal Proceeding
The Thompson Memorandum infringes on a criminal defendant's
right to fairness. According to the Supreme Court, a criminal
defendant's right to fairness is grounded in and protected by the Due
Process Clause. 15  The Supreme Court has continuously affirmed
criminal defendants' rights to fair treatment throughout the process of the
trial.
16
The required fairness that protects the autonomy of a criminal
defendant takes more than one consideration into account. 17 Fairness
prevents the prosecution from passively hampering with a defendant's
efforts to make a defense by requiring prosecutors to conduct themselves
109. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
110. Id. at 342.
111. Id. at353.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
115. Id. at 357.
116. Id.
117. Id. at353.
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accordingly and not interfere with the defense." 8 These requirements
apply to the structure and conduct of the entire criminal justice system
and provide defendants with the right to either be represented by
qualified counsel whom they can afford or to represent themselves."
9
This section is primarily concerned with a defendant's right to be
represented by a qualified attorney.
The right to be represented by a qualified attorney bestows upon a
defendant the right to control the manner and substance of their
defense. 120 The substance of a defense includes a defendant's right to
retain qualified representation with either their own assets or the assets
advanced or indemnified by their employer.12 ' The government may not
interfere with a defendant's choice of counsel because the Constitution
protects a defendant's right to free choice of counsel, independent of
concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding. 122
The Supreme Court has not explicitly characterized right to fairness
in a criminal proceeding as a fundamental right. 123 Still, the Court has
repeatedly recognized the constitutional mandate of fairness in criminal
proceedings. 124 The Court's reasoning strongly suggests that the right to
fairness in a criminal proceeding is a fundamental right for the purposes
of due process.1
25
Fundamental rights are rights that are so critical to individual liberty
that they shall not be infringed upon by the government absent a
narrowly tailored compelling state interest. 126  The foundation of the
right to fairness in a criminal proceeding is deeply rooted in the history
of the United States. 127 Without a criminal defendant's right to fairness,
neither liberty nor justice would be in existence. 128  The Thompson
Memorandum must be strictly scrutinized in order to justify government
118. Id. at 358-59.
119. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 353.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 361.
125. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 521
U.S. 793 (1997) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has actually or impliedly identified
the right to fairness in the criminal process as a fundamental right, thereby qualifying the
right to fairness for heightened judicial scrutiny).
126. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 360. There are five categories of fundamental rights
characterized by the Supreme Court: the rights to vote and participate in the electoral
process; to travel interstate; to freedom of association; to fairness in procedures
concerning individual claims against governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or
property; and to freedom of choice in matter's relating to an individual's personal life.
Id. at 360 n.148.
127. Id. (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
128. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 at 721 (1997)).
2007]
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infringement upon a criminal defendant's fundamental right to fairness
by denying their right to advancement of legal fees.
To survive strict scrutiny, government action must be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. 129 The provision of
the Thompson Memorandum at issue provides that the advancement of
legal fees by a corporation is a factor to be weighed by the prosecution in
determining whether to indict the corporation. 13  Advancement is a
factor because a corporation that advances is presumed to be protecting
culpable employees and agents.' 3 ' This negative aspect has three
goals. 1 32 First, this provision seeks to punish those whom prosecutors
deem culpable. 133 Second, this provision is intended to facilitate whether
to indict a business entity by focusing on the corporation's degree of
cooperation. 34  Third, this provision attempts to strengthen the
government's ability to prosecute white collar crime by encouraging
companies to pressure their employees to aid in the government's
investigation.
1 35
Ultimately, the first goal of the advancement provision offends a
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people that is ranked as fundamental. 36 The Thompson Memorandum
directly contradicts a criminal defendant's right to fairness. This
contradiction is an abuse of power because it imposes economic
punishment by prosecutors, prior to any findings of guilt. 37 Denying the
advancement of attorneys' fees is contrary to a criminal defendant's right
of being innocent until proven guilty. Consequently, employees are
criminalized before they receive their right to a fair trial. 38
Second, determining whether a corporation is cooperating with the
government by not advancing legal fees to its employee's is overly
broad. Today, the transfer of most of the wealth of our country is in the
hands of corporations.' 39 As a result, many financial obligations, such as
charitable contributions and the payment of legal fees, have been shifted
129. Id. at 363.
130. Thompson Memo, supra note 3, at § (VI)(B).
131. Id.
132. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513(1958) (holding that when the
constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program,
due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward
with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition).
137. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139. A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (1953) (holding that
charitable contributions were a lawful exercise of the corporation's power).
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to corporations because many individuals no longer have the financial
means to make such large expenditures. 140 Corporations pay employees'
legal fees to reciprocate the loyalty its employees have bestowed upon
the corporation. 41  The assertion that the payment of legal fees by a
corporation is indicative of an unwillingness to cooperate with the
government is not only unpersuasive, but it fails to advance a compelling
state or government interest. 42 Rather, the payment of legal fees by a
corporation serves a compelling interest because it promotes employing
individuals who take risks for a corporation without the stress of drying
up their life savings.
The third goal of the Thompson Memorandum, encouraging
employees to aid in the government's investigation, could be achieved
through alternate drafting. For example, if the government intended to
provide that the payment of legal fees was a negative factor when used
solely to impede government investigation, then the Memorandum could
have possibly been narrowly tailored. 1
43
However, the language of the Thompson Memorandum is simple.
The government is to consider the payment of attorneys' fees by a
corporation as an indicator of guilt because a corporation is presumed to
be, "protecting its culpable employees and agents."' 44  If Larry
Thompson intended for the payment of attorneys' fees to only be taken
into account when the payment was used solely to impede the
government's investigation, he failed to achieve that end.
The provision of the Thompson Memorandum that discourages the
payment of legal fees by a corporation fails strict scrutiny because it is
neither narrowly tailored nor serves a compelling governmental
objective. 45 Consequently, these provisions violate the fundamental
right of criminal fairness granted through the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.
B. The Infringement on a Criminal Defendant's Right to Fairness is
Not Limited to the Facts of United States v. Stein
United States v. Stein is perhaps the largest tax fraud case in the
140. According to the United States Census Bureau, the real median income of
American households in 2005 was $46,326. Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D.
Proctor & Cheryl Hill Lee, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2005, at 5 (2006), http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231 .pdf.
141. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Thompson Memo, supra note 3, at § (VI)(B).
145. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
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history of the United States.' 46 Although the case did not go to trial, the
cost of the defendants to simply defend their case at trial would have
easily exceeded the salaries of many of the defendants. 147  The
government expected their case-in-chief alone to last at least three
months, while the defense of the defendants would also be undoubtedly
lengthy. 148  To illustrate, assuming the defendants in Stein were
represented by a single attorney who devoted only eight hours per day in
a six month trial at a fee of $400 per hour, the cost for a single attorney
to simply attend the trial would be nearly $375,000.'14 This staggering
figure does not even account for expenses such as copying costs, review
of documents, preparation outside of the courtroom, additional attorneys,
and other complex litigation tactics. 1
50
Nonetheless, the Thompson Memorandum's infringement on the
right of fairness is not limited to the facts of Stein for two main reasons.
First, there is a need for legal representation by all criminal defendants.
Second, the costly expenses associated with corporate litigation.
Corporate employees acting on behalf of a corporation may find
themselves facing criminal- charges. In justifying the pressure on
companies to refrain from the payment of legal fees, Larry D. Thompson
was quoted as stating that employees, "don't need fancy legal
representation"' 51 if they did not believe they acted with criminal
intent.1
51
Thompson's statement could not be more inaccurate and
undignified. In 2001, along with other corporations, came the fall of
Enron and Tyco International and the rise of public attention and
awareness to corporate scandals. 153 Consequently, the twelve reasonable
persons who comprise the jury are cognizant of corporate scandals. This
awareness may cause jurors to stigmatize the defendants simply because
jurors may associate employees within corporate America as greedy or
dishonest. Because of such stereotypes, the innocent may need
competent legal representation in criminal matters as much as or even
more than the guilty. 1
54
It is common knowledge that attorneys' fees are not only expensive,
146. See id. at 362.
147. The defense of such complex litigation could cost as much as $25 million to $75
million. See Andy Vuong, Nacchio 's legal tab picked up by Qwest, DENy. POST, Jan. 26,
2007, at Al.
148. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
149. Id. at 362 n.163.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 338.
152. Id.
153. Wray & Hur, supra note 5, at 1101.
154. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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but also multiply at a rapid rate. 155 Naturally, defense costs arising out of
complex business litigation are often greater than the expenses of a less
complex criminal matter. 156  To obtain adequate defense, corporate
employees must retain counsel with sufficient skills, business
sophistication, and resources. 157  Generally, legal counsel will be
comprised of a specialized team to review and request documents, attend
depositions, and spend countless hours preparing. These tactics are
required to present the best possible case for their client. The payment of
attorneys' fees by a corporation is a sure way that an employee can
"control the manner and substance of his defense."'158
VIII.The Thompson Memorandum and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution
A. Enjoyment of the Right to a Defense
A central feature of our adversarial system 159 is a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel for their defense.
160
The right to counsel generally attaches at preliminary hearings, formal
charging, indictment, information, or arraignment.'
61
However, due to the mandate of the Thompson Memo and conduct
coupled with it, the Sixth Amendment rights of employee defendants are
likely to be violated prior to trial or hearings. 162 Violations may occur
even if the government did not consciously seek to violate the Sixth
Amendment. 163  Employees' rights will likely be violated because
through the Thompson Memorandum, the government acts to purposely
minimize a defendant's access to resources necessary to assure an
adequate defense. 
164
The Thompson Memo's minimization of a defendant's access to
resources necessary to assure an adequate defense is a constitutional
error. There are two distinct types of constitutional errors, trial errors
155. The legal fees of former Enron CEO, Jeff Skilling, were reportedly around $65
million. Vuong, supra note 147, at Al.
156. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 370.
159. Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and its Underlying
Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397,
397 (2000).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
161. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 682 (1972).
162. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 366-67.
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and structural errors. 165 Trial errors occur when evidence is presented
before the court. 16 6 Structural errors permeate the entire proceeding by
affecting the conduct of the trial from beginning to end. 1
67
A defendant seeking to overturn their conviction on a trial error, due
to the ineffective assistance of counsel, is required to prove prejudice by
demonstrating effective counsel would have produced a different
outcome. 168 However, a criminal defendant is not required to prove
prejudice when the constitutional error is structural. 169 Prejudice against
the defendant is presumed because deprivation of the right to counsel
occurs when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being
represented by the lawyer of their choice. 70 Thus, the defendant does
not need to prove the outcome would have differed.'
71
There are three ways a structural error may exist: first, when a
defendant is actively or constructively denied counsel at a critical stage
of the trial; second, when defense counsel is burdened by a conflict of
interest; or, finally, although counsel may be available, the likelihood
that a lawyer could provide effective assistance is small. 172  The
Thompson Memorandum falls into the third category of structural errors
because it limits the advancement/indemnification of attorneys' fees to
employees.
B. The Constitutional Error of the Thompson Memorandum
Properly defending white collar crimes requires "substantial
financial resources."'173 Most employee defendants may not be able to
afford attorneys who specialize in white collar crimes. Consequently the
defendants are unable to receive the effective assistance counsel.
1 74
Despite the possibility of employee defendants being represented by
counsel, prejudice may be presumed. Prejudice may be presumed
because, through the Thompson Memorandum, the government
interferes with the resources a defendant has or may legally obtain.
The provision in the Thompson Memorandum limiting the
advancement of attorneys' fees to employees is presumed to be
prejudicial because it is a structural error. Additionally, the provision
165. Id. at 370.
166. Id.
167. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
168. Id. See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (recognizing that the
right to counsel includes the right to effective counsel).
169. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 370.
172. Id. at 371.
173. Id.
174. See Vuong, supra note 147; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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violates the Sixth Amendment because it is unfair and unjustified.
1. Fairness and the Sixth Amendment
The underlying principle supporting the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel is to provide fair trials for criminal defendants. 175 The value of
"fairness" is present during trial, certain circumstances in pretrial
matters, 76 and as in the case of the Thompson Memorandum, when
government actions limit a defendant's access to funds for their
defense. 1
77
In Gideon v. Wainwright,178 the Supreme Court recognized
unfairness is inherent when defendants are financially unable to obtain
counsel for trial. 179 The Court noted, "any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him."' 80 However, if white-collar employee defendants
are or become indigent, relying upon state appointed counsel is
unrealistic, because appointed counsel will not likely possess the
required expertise for defending a white-collar crime.181
The Sixth Amendment protects more than the mere presence of a
lawyer.1 82  The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to
reasonably choose the legal counsel they desire.' 83  As with any
defendant, employees of a corporation are likely to select counsel
capable to defend complex litigation.' 84
Employees facing white-collar crimes are generally financially
unable to obtain such expensive counsel. 85 As a result, many employees
expect that attorneys' fees sustained in defending charges brought
against them by reason of their employment or contract, will be paid by
their employer. By restricting corporations from advancing attorneys'
fees, unfairness is inherent. Unfairness is inherent, because employees
are unable to finance complex litigation when it has become
commonplace for them to bear the blame for corporate wrongdoing.
Consequently, the Thompson Memorandum violates the Sixth
Amendment, because it precludes employees from presenting an
175. Gardner, supra note 159, at 399.
176. Id.
177. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
178. Gideon v. Wainwright, 377 U.S. 335 (1963).
179. Gardner, supra note 159, at 399.
180. Gideon 377 U.S. at 344.
181. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
182. Id. at 366.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 371.
185. See Vuong, supra note 174.
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adequate defense. 186
Unfairness is also inherent in the Thompson Memorandum, because
the memo is a purposeful attempt by the government to obtain an unfair
advantage over the agents of a corporation. 187  By limiting the
advancement of attorneys' fees through the Thompson Memorandum,
the government knowingly has an unfair advantage over individual
defendants. The majority of employees are not able to pay for counsel
knowledgeable in white-collar crimes. As a result, the government can
pillage the insufficient counsel just as a lion would prey on a mouse.
Moreover, the government is conscious of its advantage. The
government has pressured corporations to inform employees they are not
required to use available counsel to meet with investigators, informed the
corporation when employees failed to comply with the USAO's
demands, and implied attorneys' fees should not be advanced. Such
actions are illustrative of the government's conscious advantage and are
unjustified. 188
2. Limiting Advancement is Unjustified
The Thompson Memorandum limits employee defendants' access to
funds for their defense by using the advancement of attorneys' fees as a
factor to determine whether to indict a corporation. 89 Thompson himself
may not have been aware that limiting the advancement of attorneys'
fees would be unconstitutional. However, unless justified, such
limitations prior to indictment violate the Sixth Amendment.' 9"
In determining whether interference with the advancement of
attorneys' fees was justified, Stein utilized the common law tort of
interference with prospective economic advantage. 91 This tort examines
whether a private actor can justifiably interfere with another's economic
relations.1 92 However, because the Thompson Memorandum was drafted
by the government, the court in Stein examined whether the
government's law enforcement interests sufficiently outweighed the
interests of the defendants in having the necessary resources for an
adequate defense. 
193
186. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984) (recognizing that the right to
appear pro se affirms the dignity and autonomy of the accused, thereby allowing the
presentation of the best possible defense).
187. Gardner, supra note 159, at 414.
188. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344-47.
189. Id. at 366.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 367.
192. Id. at 368.
193. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
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The Thompson Memorandum undermines a central feature of the
United States' adversarial system by discouraging and possibly
preventing corporations from providing the financial means to employees
necessary to defend an action. 94 Consequently, regardless of the legal
standard of scrutiny, there is no justification in limiting the advancement
of attorneys' fees to employees.1 95 Employees have the right to obtain
resources lawfully available for their defense. 96  The Thompson
Memorandum violates the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution by
simply providing that advancement of legal fees is a factor for
determining whether to indict a corporation. The Memo violates the
Sixth Amendment, because the provision is not justified.
IX. Barrier to Foreign Investment
No country, including the United States, could prosper without the
flow of foreign capital. 197 However, the Thompson Memorandum may
undo years of goodwill and profits. 198  Multinational corporations
incorporated or wanting to incorporate in the United States may follow
the correct process of incorporating in its state of incorporation.
However, multinational corporations may fail to be aware or understand
the legal mores of criminalizing a corporation developed by the
Thompson Memorandum.'9 9 In fact, the Holder Memorandum warned
that prosecution guidelines may give rise to financial policy concerns
because corporate conduct, particularly that of national and multi-
national corporations, necessarily intersects with federal economic
policies.200
In addition to U.S. tax laws, the Thompson Memorandum has a
great impact on multinational incorporation. Although the Thompson
Memorandum did not undergo the proper administrative law
procedures,20 ' it is, "binding on all federal prosecutors.' That is, all
United States Attorneys are required to consider the advancement of
legal fees by corporations as a factor in determining whether to indict a
corporation.20 3 The Thompson Memorandum is a barrier to foreign
194. Id.
195. Id. at 369.
196. Id.
197. Stephen J. McGarry, Pathfinder for Doing Business Abroad, 22 INT'L LAW. 483,
486 (1988).
198. Id. at 483.
199. Id. at 484.
200. Holder Memo, supra note 60, at § (III)(A).
201. The administrative law issues of the Thompson Memorandum will not be
discussed in this Comment.
202. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
203. Id.
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investment because it interferes with the policies supporting
advancement and indemnification.20 4
Delaware, the leading state of corporate law, recognizes dual
policies supporting the principle of indemnification.2 °5  First,
indemnification allows corporate officials to resist unjustified lawsuits
through the security that, if vindicated, the corporation will pay litigation
associated expenses.20 6 Second, indemnification encourages individuals
to serve as corporate directors and officers with the security that the
corporation will pay the cost of defending the honesty and integrity of its
employees.2°7
Although some may view the indemnification of corporate
employees receiving six and seven figure salaries as an undue benefit to
already exorbitant salaries, indemnification is quite beneficial to
corporations. The democratic nature of corporations illustrates that
shareholders want and encourage most employees to engage in broad
decision making. 208 Such broad decision making may include taking
economic risks to increase the value of shareholders' stock.20 9
Indemnification allows employees to venture out and take risks that
benefit the corporation without the stress of financing possible legal
210
repercussions.
Advancement of attorneys' fees, similar to indemnification, is sound
public policy. 211  Individuals who serve corporations should not be
required to finance a defense that is generally beyond their financial
means. 2 2 Advancement promotes the same salutary public policy as
indemnification, which is to attract the most capable people into
corporate service.21 3 Thus, advancement also allows employees to take
reasonable risks that benefit shareholders. Despite the benefits of a
corporation paying the legal fees of its employees, advancement is a,
"desirable underwriting of risk by the corporation in anticipation of
greater corporate wide rewards. 2 14  Simply put, advancement and
indemnification benefit a corporation more than the covered employee.21 5
Advancement and indemnification encourage well-qualified persons
204. See McGarry, supra note 197, at 483.
205. VonFeldt, 714 A.2d 79 at 84.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Radin, supra note 26, at 260.
209. Id.
210. Risks taken by employees of a corporation should be prudent because the right to
indemnification requires a successful defense.
211. Id. at 262.
212. Id.
213. Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d 204 at 218.
214. Id. at 211 (citing Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 111 (Del. 2001).
215. Radin, supra note 26, at 260.
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willing to exercise good faith and care to take risks that enhance the
economic return of a corporation.216 Thus, multinational corporations
located in the United States are able to obtain competent and qualified
employees who benefit the corporation while keeping up with a
competitive market.
Yet, by factoring the advancement of attorneys' fees in determining
whether to indict a corporation,1 7 the Thompson Memorandum deters
and contributes to the exodus of multinational corporations for two
reasons. First, multinational corporations require employees familiar
with the United States economy. Second, multinational corporations
want employees willing to take risks in order to place the corporation in
an aggressive economic position of one of the most competitive markets
in the global economy.
Many qualified employees may be unwilling to work for a
corporation who does not advance or indemnify attorneys' fees. This
unwillingness limits the availability of competent employees and
contributes to the decline of FDI. Foreign investors want to maintain a
competitive position, but are restricted when they cannot obtain adequate
employees.
The decline of FDI results from corporate exodus. Corporate
exodus weakens both the economic and political position of the United
States.218 Corporations who relocate or incorporate in a country other
than the United States cause economic and social activities such as law,
finance, and distribution to also relocate. 219 For example, a multinational
corporation relocating to a foreign country would have to obtain
attorneys and accountants from the country in which it relocated to assist
with legal activities and familiarize it with the country's economy. The
exodus of multinational corporations that may have been caused by the
Thompson Memorandum not only impacts the U.S. economy through the
removal of business, but also creates fewer business opportunities for
American industries. 220  The Thompson Memorandum places the
economic future of the United States at risk by factoring the
advancement of attorneys' fees as an indicia of guilt. In order to restore
the economic standing of the United States a change is necessary.
216. Fasciana v. Elec. Data Systems, 829 A.2d 160, at 170 (Del. Ch. 2003).
217. Thompson Memo, supra note 3, at § (VI)(B).
218. Melnik, supra note 10, at 108.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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X. A Time for Change
A. The McNulty Memorandum
Following the decision of United States v. Stein, there was an
eruption of criticism surrounding the Thompson Memorandum as it
relates to attorneys' fees. The DOJ surrendered to the legitimate
criticism and acknowledged their tactics were relentless by making an
unprecedented change to the prosecutorial guidelines.
Senator Arlen Specter, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, was perhaps the cardinal critic of the Thompson
Memorandum. On December 7, 2006, Senator Specter introduced the
"Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006.,,221 The proposed Act
was designed to curtail the aggressive tactics of the Thompson
Memorandum.222 One of the purposes of the Act was to reflect that,
"[j]ustice is served when all parties to litigation are represented by
experienced diligent counsel., 223 The Act was designed to preserve the
fundamental legal protections and rights of employees by preventing
federal agents and attorneys from considering the contribution of legal
fees to employees as an indicator of guilt.224 In response to Senator
Specter's Bill, and the concerns of the legal community, Deputy
Attorney General, Paul McNulty, realized the Thompson Memo
guidelines were abusive.225 Subsequently, McNulty introduced what has
been dubbed the McNulty Memorandum.
The McNulty Memorandum was introduced only five days after
Senator Specter introduced his proposed legislation.226 Pursuant to the
McNulty Memorandum, prosecutors should no longer factor a business
organization's advancement of legal fees to employees as an averment of
guilt.227  Yet, a footnote provides, in extremely rare cases the
advancement of attorneys' fees can be considered when the totality of the
circumstances indicate advancement was intended to impede a criminal
221. Ashby Jones, Specter Takes on Thompson Memo, WALL STREET JOURNAL
ONLINE, Dec. 7, 2006 http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/07/specter-takes-on-thompson-
memo/. Senator Specter's Bill was introduced to the public, but not before Congress.
222. Id.
223. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
224. Id. at § 3.
225. Lynnley Browning, Judge's Rebuke Prompts New Rules for Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at C4.
226. Jones, supra note 221.
227. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to
Heads of Department Components U.S. Attorneys, at (VII)(B)(3) (Dec. 12, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty.memo.pdf § (VII)(B)(3)
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007) [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
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investigation.228
This dramatic shift by the DOJ clearly indicates the government was
aware it was exploiting the advancement of attorneys' fees to the
detriment of employees. Commanding federal agents to no longer
consider the. advancement of fees in prosecuting a corporation is the
inverse of the DOJ's Thompson Memorandum. Moreover, the
Memorandum went into effect without awaiting an appeal of Stein,
thereby implying that the DOJ anticipated Judge Kaplan's ruling would
be affirmed.
B. Mixed Signals
Since the introduction of the Holder Memorandum in 1999, federal
prosecutors have factored the payment of attorneys' fees by a corporation
in determining whether to indict the corporation. Consequently, the
introduction of the McNulty Memorandum has sent mixed signals to
federal prosecutors, corporations, and foreign investors.
Written in the preface of the McNulty Memorandum is a hidden
message. Deputy Attorney General McNulty states, "corporations
recognize the need for self-policing, self-reporting, and cooperation with
law enforcement., 229 The message to corporations is that the denial of
fees to employees is an appropriate method of policing and cooperating
with officials.23° Moreover, applauding the fundamental principles
guiding prosecutors as "sound," McNulty ignores both the communal
outcry and the Thompson Memorandum's violation of the
Constitution.23' The McNulty Memorandum may not be sufficient to
preclude federal prosecutors and agents from regressing to their
aggressive tactics that ignore the constitutional rights of employees.
C. Is the McNulty Memorandum Constitutional?
Since the introduction of the McNulty Memorandum, the majority
of critics have focused on the issue of whether McNulty properly
addressed the issue of the waiver of attorney-client privilege and
neglected the issue of advancement. The negligence is due to the
wording of the McNulty Memorandum appearing to overhaul the
constitutional issues faced by the Thompson Memorandum.
228. Id. at n.3. Even if the circumstances indicate the advancement of fees was
intended to impede investigation, the agent(s) and/or prosecutor(s) must obtain
permission from the Deputy Attorney General to consider advancement as a factor for
indictment of the corporation. Id.
229. Id. at preface.
230. Id. at preface.
231. McNulty Memo, supra note 226, at preface.
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By providing that prosecutors generally should not evaluate the
advancement of attorneys' fees when determining whether to indict a
corporation, the McNulty Memorandum is narrowly tailored and
minimizes, if not eliminates the violation of the Fifth Amendment.232
This provision is narrowly tailored because prosecutors are only to
consider the advancement of fees in extremely rare cases when
circumstances indicate advancement is intended to impede a criminal
investigation.233 Although the McNulty Memorandum may minimize the
violation of the Fifth Amendment, an issue with the Sixth Amendment
remains.
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, employees have a constitutional
right to receive and utilize attorneys' fees advanced by their employer.
The fact that the advancement of fees may be part of an obstruction
scheme is, "insufficient to justify the government's interference with the
right of individual criminal defendants to obtain resources lawfully
available to them in order to defend themselves, regardless of the legal
standard of scrutiny applied., 234  Yet again, the DOJ falls short of
defending and complying with the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment
provides all individuals with the constitutional right to be represented by
the attorney of their desire through utilizing fees advanced to them by
their employer. Corporations are advancing fees to employees to acquire
the most qualified individuals, not to hinder an investigation. To suggest
the advancement of fees may hinder an investigation implies that the
attorney(s) of an employee may be acting in an unethical manner, which
is an entirely separate issue.
XI. Conclusion
The prosecution of corporations has undergone various transitions.
The transitions, set out as principle guidelines, have caused corporations
to deny the advancement of legal fees to its employees. Subsequently,
employees have been victimized and are forced to play the leading role
in criminal indictments because they cannot afford suitable counsel.
This denial caused and still causes the government to violate the supreme
law on which our country is founded. The guidelines of corporate
prosecution have also contributed to multinational corporate exodus,
because they directly contradict the policies supporting advancement and
indemnification. The government has tried to correct their inexcusable
oversight. Whether prosecutors will follow the new practice, may still
require an act of Congress.
232. Id. at § (VII)(B)(3).
233. Id.
234. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
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